Real-Time Thermal Ratings is an emerging technique used to calculate the rating of electrical conductors based on local, real-time weather conditions; this leads to an increased rating with respect to conventional approaches the majority of the time, and can be used to increase the energy yield of distributed generators, support the network during outages and defer network reinforcement. Unfortunately it is not presently recognised in network planning, design and security of supply standards. This represents a barrier to utilizing Real-Time Thermal Ratings in power networks, and must be addressed. This paper presents a new, probabilistic method for accounting for the variable ratings during network planning. This is coupled with an analysis of the risk of being unable to supply customers in a network adopting variable ratings, compared with the risk in the same network using conventional ratings; hence the method proposed in this paper allows additional load to be connected to the network at a quantified level of risk. Finally, this method could be applied to other emerging network technologies and techniques such as demand side management or energy storage.
Introduction
Electrical networks are undergoing a fundamental change in function and operation. As a result of decarbonisation targets [1] , electricity consumption is predicted to increase to accommodate electric heating and transport, with some studies suggesting electricity demand could as much as double. At the same time, generation is being connected to the distribution network when conventionally it was only connected to the transmission network. These factors could lead to networks requiring substantial reinforcement, at the cost of billions of pounds, to maintain high levels of reliability.
Smart grids represent an alternative to conventional reinforcement by obtaining more capacity from the assets already in place. This is achieved through active monitoring and control, along with the use of innovative technologies and the involvement of the customer [2] . However, the contribution many of these technologies make to security of supply is variable and must be properly quantified.
This paper examines the contribution of one such technique, Real-Time Thermal Ratings (RTTR), using the Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) by a Perfect Circuit method, and proposes an alternative probabilistic method. In a probabilistic method, variables are treated as probability distributions rather than fixed values.
RTTR comes from the observation that the first limit of a current carrying conductor is its temperature. Conventionally, conductors are given a rating based on a low probability of exceeding a certain design temperature, derived from a conservative set of weather conditions, some of which have remained the same since the 1930s [3] [4] [5] . In reality a conductor's rating is continually fluctuating, which leads to unexploited capacity the majority of the time, and some occasions when the real rating drops below static ratings. This additional capacity has been well documented [6] [7] [8] [9] , as have its potential applications [10] [11] [12] .
While all electrical conductors can take advantage of RTTR, overhead lines show the greatest potential [6] , as such they provide the focus for the work presented in this paper. Underground cables and power transformers can be operated at an elevated rating on a cyclic basis thanks to their high thermal time constants [13, 14] , and consequently could be coupled with overhead lines utilising RTTR. This is particularly true for security of supply, when the increased ratings will only be relied on during a contingency.
RTTR offers substantial benefits; however power network operators are primarily concerned with providing safe, reliable networks. If RTTR is implemented without adequately quantifying the risk, then it could increase risk and be rejected, or be adopted with inadequate regulation and provide little benefit. However, a properly planned and analysed RTTR deployment could actually reduce operating risk, by allowing network operators to see when the line rating is below the static rating and hence take corrective action. The archival value of this paper is that it quantifies the risk associated with using RTTR to supply additional demand. Furthermore, it also allows quantification of the risk already present in the network. This is coupled with an examination of the existing network design standard in the UK, which this paper shows is not fit for purpose for use with RTTR, or indeed any non-deterministic network asset, in its current form.
Operational and installation difficulties involved with implementing RTTR are not considered in this work, though there is a body of published work on this subject [7, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Instead, the focus of this paper is on unlocking the benefits RTTR can provide at the distribution network planning stage, allowing additional load to be connected without requiring costly network reinforcement. This paper is based on data from the UK, and hence initially investigates the impact of RTTR with respect to the line rating and distribution network security standards in the UK [4, 20] . RTTR can of course be deployed in other countries, and while its effectiveness will be affected by local climate and demand patterns [21] , the methods presented in this paper are still applicable. This is because analysis carried out in developing the new probabilistic method was done considering the fundamental problem of line ratings, and how it relates to security of supply for customers, rather than from the perspective of the existing standards.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 examines the network security standards in the UK and elsewhere, and investigates the benefits that variable capacity providers can make to network security. Section 3 discusses the data used to perform the analysis. Section 4 describes the Expected Energy Not Supplied by Equivalent Perfect Circuit method for assessing intermittent generation; this is then used to assess the contribution of RTTR to security of supply, and its shortcomings are discussed. In section 5 a new probabilistic method is proposed, which examines the confidence of using RTTR to connect varying levels of additional load, and quantifies the risk associated with doing so. Broader applications of this work and concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
Review of Network Security Standards
This section discusses the standards governing security of supply to demand groups in distribution networks. Network security is dominated internationally by the N-k principle. A network with N components must be able to service all customers even if k components are unavailable. In the UK, standard P2/6 governs security of supply during distribution network planning, prescribing the required level of security for different sizes of demand group. While P2/6 is a deterministic standard, assuming all variables have fixed values, there is an exception for the way intermittent generation is treated.
Outside the UK, network planning and security standards at the distribution level are less universal, often being enforced differently by individual distribution companies. In China standards govern transmission level generation adequacy but have little impact on distribution level security of supply [22] . In the USA security standards are set on a state by state basis, with various bodies being involved including NERC (National Electricity Reliability Corporation) [23] , PUCs (Public Utilities Commissions) and the utilities themselves. Though transmission level reliability is subject to stringent N-1 and N-2 security, distribution does not have a prescriptive security standard like P2/6. Some PUCs enforce financial penalties to distribution network operators if customers are disconnected, but this is not ubiquitous.
Deterministic, N-1 style network security criteria can lead to situations where a network is over secure in some circumstances and under secure in others [24] . An Example of this is the use of dual circuits on the same towers to provide redundancy; although this provides sufficient redundancy according to network design standards, in reality there is a significant probability of any failure on one circuit affecting the other [25] . Another example is the assumption that rating values are infallible, when in reality components will be unable to work at this level for some proportion of the time. However, network operators are much more comfortable with these inflexible rules than with a probabilistic method, which can seem complicated and difficult to apply [26] .
The impetus is on the industry to change. These variable quantities, which could appear problematic to the existing system, can actually offer benefits to network security. Many authors [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] provide a benefit that cannot be easily quantified. The current standard essentially allows them to add their average output, or capacity factor, to network security calculations [20] . This approach does not take adequate account of the variability of the system and will, like the deterministic criteria of which it is a product, lead to some occasions when the network is overly secure as a result of inefficient design and others when there is a risk of customer disconnection, damage to equipment and infringement of safety standards. While overly secure network design could be seen as desirable, it leads to an increased cost of energy, delays in connecting new loads or generators, and increases the carbon footprint of the power network.
Smart grids, and RTTR in particular, are similar to distributed generation in terms of supplementing network security. The potential benefits of RTTR are much higher than those arising from DG, due to the high average uplift in overhead line ratings [6] . DG is already rated to a fraction of the line rating, and is then further reduced by its low contribution. Conversely RTTR could increase the whole rating by 70% or more. This means the risk introduced by using an inappropriate value for DG is a fraction of that if an inappropriate value is selected for RTTR.
Power system security standards in the UK and elsewhere are inherently deterministic, relying on Nk criteria to secure customer connections. These standards were developed in a time when implementing a probabilistic or risk based standard would have been impractical due to the lack of appropriate measurement, control, IT and communication systems, and prohibitive computational cost. However with the technologies now available, a risk-based energy security standard is a realistic prospect, and initial evidence suggests it could lead to a reduction in planning and operational costs, without compromising security of supply [33] .
Meteorological Data Sources
For the studies presented in this paper, real weather data from 4 sites in the UK were used. Hourly average wind speed, wind direction, solar irradiance and ambient temperature data were available at an hourly resolution for a period of one year. There were times when the weather data was not available; the completeness of each data set is shown in Table 1 , along with the mean wind speeds and temperatures for each site. Valley is both the most complete data set, and has the highest mean wind speed. Given that wind speed has the greatest impact on conductor rating [6] , this implies that an overhead line at Valley would have a higher rating than the other sites. The sites are spread across the UK, in a mixture of coastal and inland areas.
Calculating the Contribution of RTTR by Evaluating Expected Energy Not Supplied by an Equivalent Perfect Circuit
A distributed generator can add capacity to the network by supplying loads connected to the same substation directly. This alleviates some of the load on the conductors supplying that substation, allowing more load to be connected. RTTR can offer a similar benefit, supplying additional customers by allowing more power to flow through the existing overhead lines. In either case, the network is designed such that the additional capacity will only be relied upon in a contingency. The additional will still provide a benefit during normal operation, since its existence allows the network to operate at a higher level of utilisation in pre-fault conditions. It is worth noting that this configuration is not universal, and in some cases there will be no redundancy and the additional capacity will be utilised more frequently.
The methods in this section, and the probabilistic methods in section 5, consider a simple arrangement of a load connected to the grid through two overhead lines of the same static seasonal rating. By the N-1 principle, the load cannot exceed the static seasonal rating of one conductor. By deploying RTTR onto the conductors, their ratings can be increased and consequently more load can be connected. The objective is to calculate how much additional load can be connected without compromising security of supply. The additional capacity provided by RTTR is represented by a so called 'perfect circuit'. This is an additional circuit connected to a load centre with 100% reliability, and the same Expected Energy
Not Supplied (EENS) as the variable capacity source, as illustrated in Figure 1 . This approach uses a single, constant value to represent a variable, probabilistic parameter; this is simple for a network operator to apply, but could lead to a risk of excursion, where the load current exceeds the line ratings, if the number is not selected carefully. The additional capacity is modelled using a capacity outage probability table (COPT) and the load is represented by a load duration curve (LDC).
Contribution to security represents the additional percentage of a conductor's static seasonal rating that can be relied upon in a contingency. This contribution corresponds to the additional load that could be securely accommodated.
Conductor Rating Calculations
Overhead line models have been developed by CIGRE [35], the IEC [36] and the IEEE [37] . Each of these is a lumped parameter model calculating the maximum current which can pass through a conductor without causing it to exceed a design temperature. A steady state energy balance is solved between the heating through solar radiation and the joule effect, and the cooling through forced convection, free convection and radiation. The rating is dependent on the wind speed, wind direction, ambient temperature and solar radiation local to the conductor. Several studies have compared the different models to experimental data with mixed results [38, 39] , though all provide reasonable approximations to the physical system. For the purposes of this paper, the CIGRE overhead line model was used for all rating calculations.
The weather data were used to calculate conductor ratings assuming the conductor was located at the site of the measurement, with the observed wind direction assumed to be the direction of the flow with respect to the conductor. In reality the effectiveness of an RTTR system is reliant on the operator having accurate information about the critical, or determining, spans within the network.
These spans could be a result of specific conductor location and sheltering affects from trees or buildings. Because this paper is concerned with quantifying the benefits of RTTR this effect is not considered, however an investigation into the impact of the distance between the critical span and rating calculation accuracy is presented in [40] . In order to calculate the effective current carrying capacity of a conductor, the additional capacity due to RTTR is assumed analogous to intermittent generation [34] . The method necessitates calculating not just the probability of the line ratings exceeding a certain value, but the probability of the rating exceeding a certain value for a given length of time, referred to as the persistence time,
Expected Energy Not Supplied by a Perfect Circuit
Tm. Figure 2 illustrates the method used to generate the COPT for the capacity model. The weather data from each site was used to calculate one year of sequential conductor ratings. This data was then compared to a number of rating levels, R i , from 0% extra capacity (the existing static rating) to 100% extra capacity. The following steps were undertaken for each level:
 Identify each instance where the capacity is at least equal to R i and continues to be for at least a Persistence Time, Tm.
 Count the number of times this occurs n ij , and the duration of each occurrence t ij . These ensembles will not overlap, since this could result in the same ensemble contributing multiple times.
 If T is the total time period of the study, then the cumulative probability, CPi, that the capacity is at least R i. is given by:
 This is then repeated for each rating level from 0%-100% additional capacity, and each minimum time Tm from 1 hour to 168 hours. Each capacity state is denoted by R i and the cumulative probability by CP i .
 The individual state probabilities, P i , are then obtained from the cumulative probability.
The results from the capacity output probability table are used to calculate the effective contribution of the asset by evaluating the EENS:
 Each state of the COPT is superimposed on the LDC as shown in Figure 3 . In this case it is necessary to determine a maximum possible rating. When using the LDC with a generator, 100% load is set to the maximum generator output. Since there is no set maximum rating for an overhead line, 100% additional capacity was used as the maximum. Although this assumption means the highest rating states will not be utilised, it was justified by the fact these states have a low probability of occurring, and the rest of the network equipment would not be capable of operating at such an enhanced rating.
 The energy not supplied, E, is determined for each state as the area below the LDC and above the capacity available.
 This value is weighted by the probability of being in the capacity state.
 These weighted values of energy are summated over all capacity states (with the sum of probabilities for all capacity states being 1).
 From the concept of expectation: 
Energy Not Supplied, Ei
The capacity of a perfect circuit that would give the same level of EENS is then calculated. This is defined as the effective rating of the circuit. This is used to calculate the contribution of RTTR by dividing by the total energy required by the maximum uplift considered, in this case 100% of the static line rating.
Results
The contribution to security was evaluated for each of the four primary sites used for this study.
Each case showed a similar pattern, with a high contribution to security decaying as Tm increased.
As would be expected from the high wind speeds, Valley offered the highest contribution to security in the short term. However, as Tm increased, Valley's contribution value decayed more quickly than the other sites. This could be attributed to the fact that a high average wind speed does not necessarily correspond to a consistently high one.
All of the contribution values were high compared to those attributed to wind generation [31] .
However, this is in line with expectations given that wind farms typically have a capacity factor of 25-30% while, in the UK, RTTR offers average rating increases to overhead lines of 70-100% [6] . Figure 4 shows the mean security contribution for the four hourly sites. The upper and lower bounds show the results modified by one standard deviation between mean values at the four sites. Based on these results, it would be reasonable to conclude that RTTR can provide a significant benefit to security of supply. Unfortunately, this method only allows the benefits to be quantified. Electrical networks are operated on a low risk basis, so it was prudent to investigate how increasing the load affects the risk of line ratings being exceeded. Though the methodology used to calculate the contribution to security in section 4 was inherently probabilistic, no account was made of the level of risk that would be introduced to the system were it implemented. Since the contribution from wind power, for which the methodology was originally conceived, is relatively small, the associated risk could be considered acceptable. However since RTTR provides a much larger contribution to security of supply, the risks should the technology be misrepresented are proportionally greater. As such it was prudent to investigate these risks before recommending such an approach be taken forward. shows the small area where the load and rating intersect, in which it is possible to for the load to exceed the RTTR. As the load is increased the load PDF will expand to the right, increasing the probability of the load being greater than the conductor rating. Quantifying this probability is essential to successfully incorporating RTTR into the industry standards.
Proposed Probabilistic Method
Although it is unlikely that the highest ratings will be utilised due to external factors such as voltage constraints and protection settings, the rating will still be far above the maximum load. The benefit of RTTR does not lie in trying to unlock the low probability, high rating states, rather in taking advantage of the fact that there is a high probability of ratings being above the load. Repeat n times A Monte Carlo approach was used to calculate the likelihood of the load exceeding the conductor rating. This involved taking a set of random samples from the load and ratings probability distributions, and comparing the two. A flow chart showing the calculation procedure is shown in Figure 6 . The probability of an excursion was then calculated:
Where L is the load, R is the rating and n is the size of the sample set. The line rating PDFs were calculated using the method described in section 4.2, and fitting non-parametric distributions to the results. Non-parametric distributions are models created directly from data rather than by using a conventional distribution and parameters such as mean and variance. This approach allows the persistence values to be considered in the probabilistic evaluation because this concept remains valuable to network planners and operators. The PDF calculated from the LDC (shown in Figure 5) was used for the load. As the contribution to security was increased, the load PDF was increased linearly.
This method calculates the confidence of not exceeding the rating in the event of a contingency.
Confidence is defined as the probability that the rating of a single conductor is greater than the load current. Figure 7 shows the results of the probabilistic analysis. Confidence values vary from 98% for small contributions and low Tm to less than 5% for high contributions with Tm up to one week. This tells a network operator the probability that RTTR will be able to support the network in a given contingency, for varying levels of additional load. The true probability of the ratings being exceeded is the product of the probability of a contingency and the probability of an excursion. The confidence values corresponding to the contributions suggested by the Equivalent EENS method are very low; this illustrates how inappropriate that method is for RTTR. 
Results

Repair Times
The persistence values are important for network operators because they provide information about not only how much capacity can be relied upon, but also how long it can be relied upon for. These times can be related to network repair times. Based on the distribution suggested by [41], Table 2 shows the percentage of faults that are restored within different durations. The majority of faults are repaired within 6 hours, which corresponds to confidences of 83% and above for capacity increases up to 30%. Most outages in excess of 12 hours are a result of planned maintenance. In these cases, the outage is often planned such that the network can be restored quickly in the event of a contingency.
Definition and Quantification of Risk
Knowing the likelihood of an excursion is not enough to understand the risk it poses to a network.
Risk is defined as the product of likelihood and consequence. The likelihood in this case corresponds to the probability there is an outage leading to an excursion. The consequence represents the severity of the action that must be taken by network operators to avoid endangering the public and damaging equipment. For example, an excursion of only 5-10%, for only a few minutes, is unlikely to cause damage to equipment or endanger the public, since the conductor will not have time to heat up to its steady state temperature. However a large or prolonged excursion is more likely to have severe consequences. For the purposes of this paper, severity and duration of an excursion will be considered equal contributors to network risk. This leads to the definition of risk:
Where P is probability, S is severity and T is average excursion time. Figure 8(b) illustrates that the risk associated with using RTTR in network security is primarily associated with excursions of 5-30% above conductor rating. Larger excursions are unlikely to occur, while smaller excursions are unlikely to damage equipment or cause overhead lines to breach clearance restrictions.
The excursion probability distribution was generated by a MC evaluation of the difference between the load and the rating. Figure 8(a) shows the tail of the distribution associated with the load being greater than the rating. The risk density plot is the product of the excursion PDF and the consequences described in equation 4 ( Figure 8(b) ); the average excursion length was assessed using a similar method to that described in section 4.2, but calculating the average time for which the rating was below the load, using real load data from an RTTR trial site [18] , rather than the probability of it being above a rating level. It is important to understand how the level of risk varies as the contribution to network security increases. Figure 9 shows the total risk associated with increasing the maximum permissible load by up to 50% of the seasonal static rating. This was calculated by evaluating the cumulative risk for each additional load case, as shown in Figure 8 (c) and normalising it by the risk associated with the static rating. The results indicate that adding an additional 50% load would lead to an increase in risk of approximately one order of magnitude. Smaller increases in load yield smaller increases in risk, with an additional 15% load corresponding to a doubling in the existing risk.
These increases in risk seem alarming, but there are a number of factors which mean that increasing the load through the use of RTTR is a very real possibility. First, the existing risk is low; the conservative design of networks means that the majority of the time equipment is operated far below its static rating. Secondly, the increase in risk can be offset by active monitoring and control. A doubling of risk seems much more acceptable when it is accompanied by the ability to perceive and take action against not only this new risk, but the existing risk as well. Excursions will only occur when peak load and low RTTR coincide with a contingency. If Demand Side Response was used to reduce the peak loads [42] , the risk would be reduced. Additionally, if energy storage or DG was available during low rating events, the risk could again be reduced. Normally open points at lower voltage levels could also be closed to alleviate the increased power flows. All of this is made possible by the increased observability of the network's ratings provided by RTTR.
The UK line rating standard, P27, sets the rating with a degree of risk, but does so assuming that the conductor is always being utilized at 100% of its static rating [4, 43] . The assumed risk associated with the P27 dual and single circuit ratings, corresponding to excursion probabilities of 3% and 0.01% respectively, are plotted along with the actual risk in Figure 9 , to give an indication of what is considered an acceptable level of risk. The excursion risk associated with connecting 50% additional load is comparable to the risk assumed for a 0.01% excursion probability, and far lower than the risk assumed for a 3% excursion probability.
Impact of Data Temporal Resolution
The results presented have used data recorded at a temporal resolution of one hour. Since the time constant of an overhead line is 10-20 minutes [44] , the sampling theorem suggests that using 5 minute data would be more appropriate. The time constant of the overhead conductor is dependent on wind speed, with lower time constants at higher wind speeds. This is helpful from an RTTR perspective; because the rating is greater at higher wind speeds, sudden changes in current are less likely to cause overloads in these cases.
Data from an RTTR trial site was available at 5 minute resolution [16] . This data was averaged into an hourly data set, and the probabilistic method was applied to both the hourly data and the 5 minute data. Figure 10 shows the effect of data resolution on the proposed probabilistic method. Using 5 minute data reduces the confidence by around 5% for low contributions, and around 15% for high contributions; the author suggests this reduction be applied if using hourly data to estimate the contribution of RTTR. It may also be prudent to alter the minimum Tm based on the time constant of the overhead line, given that the time constant is affected by the dimensions of the conductor. 
Conclusions
This paper has proposed a probabilistic method for power network planning, allowing additional load to be connected through the increased capacity provided by RTTR. This additional capacity can be accommodated at a quantified level of risk, ensuring safe and secure operation. Though increasing the level of load above the maximum load permitted by the n-1 principle leads to an incremental increase in the risk of damaging equipment, using RTTR to increase load should still be considered a valid option for connecting additional load without the need for new infrastructure.
Because RTTR will increase the thermal observability of the network, operators will be able to take corrective action to mitigate not only any additional risk introduced through the implementation of RTTR, but also on the risk that is already present in the system. Consequently, an appropriately planned RTTR deployment could lead to increased network capacity and safer operation.
The method used Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to calculate the probability of line rating being sufficient to meet demand for varying load cases. Probability distributions of excursions above RTTR were derived to quantify the risk to security of supply, which was defined as the product of the probability, severity and duration of the excursion. Although the results in this paper use weather data from across the UK, any real RTTR deployment will be highly dependent on the local weather conditions, the alignment of the conductors relative to the prevailing wind direction, sheltering effects near to the line (such as trees or buildings) and anticipated load patterns. Furthermore, it is likely there is some correlation between line ratings and demand; indeed there is evidence such a correlation exists between ambient temperature and demand [45] , particularly in summer peaking systems [46] . As a consequence of these factors, confidence and risk values will vary on a per site basis. Because the techniques provide complete information about the levels of risk and confidence, operators can choose appropriate values based on specific load groups, the corrective options available and their own preferences.
Though initially the problem was approached from the perspective of the existing network planning framework in the UK, the method used to represent variable contributions to network security was found not to be fit for purpose. Representing variable quantities using single values and taking no account of the risk and uncertainty is unlikely to yield a successful RTTR implementation. Instead, the model proposed in this paper removes a fundamental barrier to the adoption of RTTR. By allowing network operators to see the benefits and the associated risks arising from adoption of RTTR at the network planning stage, this paper can build confidence in the technology and demonstrate, at the network planning stage, that RTTR is a real alternative to costly network reinforcement. Intelligent, rigorously planned RTTR schemes have the potential to save billions of pounds that would otherwise be required for network reinforcement, and can unlock the additional capacity in a fraction of the time that would be required to build new infrastructure. An important next step is to evaluate the financial value of RTTR Finally, although this paper has only discussed this method within the context of RTTR, the probabilistic planning method put forward in this paper could be used with other variable network technologies. The state of charge of energy storage, the variable impact of Demand Side Response
